World War II changed
the political dynamic of the world. Nations who held enormous economic and
political power were left with severely damaged infrastructures and many were
nearly bankrupt. Because of the geographical location of the United States, it
was largely untouched by the war. This left the US in a prime position to move
into a place of leadership in the world. With a fairly stable economy and
infrastructure, and a large military, the US was a true superpower. Despite the
United States new status among the nations of the world, it “approached the
postwar world with much uncertainty.”[1]
By
the end of the war, a new adversary was rising. The Soviet Union was the
largest and most powerful nation in Europe and Asia, and the United States
strategists believed that the Soviets had plans for global domination. This was
reinforced by Stalin’s reluctance to fulfill his pledge to free nations
liberated from Nazi Germany after the war. Dean Acheson, the Undersecretary of
State, was an advocate of force rather than negotiations in relationship with
the Soviet Union. The failed attempts to appease Hitler taught him that “power,
rather than negotiations, checked potential aggression…”[2] When
the Soviets appeared to be taking advantage of the postwar situations in Greece
and Turkey, Acheson warned that “the Communists would contaminate Western
Europe and the Middle East”[3]
in the same way that rot spread from fruit to fruit.
The
Truman
Doctrine[4]
committed the US to aid and support both Greece and Turkey in an effort to deny
them to the Soviet Union. It was a policy of containment that would build areas
of strength around Soviet controlled territory seeking to stop the spread of
the Soviet Union in particular and communism in general. Truman’s advisors
believed this to be a struggle of life and death.
Using
rhetoric of extremes, President Truman lumped all “ways of life” under two
labels, “One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is
distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections,
guaranties of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom
from political oppression”. He continues, “The second way of life is based upon
the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon
terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio, fixed elections and the
suppression of personal freedoms”.[5]
The language of the Truman Doctrine betrayed a deeply held sense of superiority
which would show up again and again in US international policy. It was also a
masterful effort to manipulate the situation through fear. By drawing such
stark contrasts, President Truman effectively demanded that congress and the
world choose sides. The fact that the sides were ideological extremes, defined
in “black and white” language, helped to place the stakes well above the
individual human beings who were involved on both sides of situation. Because
it was the ideal that was at stake, atrocities could be committed and tolerated
as long as the goal of the “greater picture” was held firmly in sight.
Less
than a year after the implementation of the Truman Doctrine, the Marshal Plan
was designed as a massive financial investment in the reconstruction of Western
Europe.[6]
Primarily focused on blocking Communist influence in France and Italy, the
Marshal plan trapped the US into a game of blackmail with France in Indochina. Because
the US believed it was fighting for global stakes, and France was simply trying
to retain a colonial possession, the US had more invested in the stability of
Indochina than the French did.
In 1948, a review of US policy towards Indochina made it
clear that the US long-term goals were not being met.
Our long-term objectives are: (1)
to eliminate so far as possible Communist influence in Indochina and to see
installed a self-governing nationalist state which will be friendly to the US
and which, commensurate with the capacity of the peoples involved, will be
patterned upon our conception of a democratic state as opposed to the
totalitarian state which would evolve inevitably from Communist domination; (2)
to foster the association of the peoples of Indochina with the western powers,
the end that those peoples will prefer freely to cooperate with the western
powers culturally, economically and politically; (3) to raise the standard of living
so that the peoples of Indochina will be less receptive to totalitarian
influences and will have an incentive to work productively and thus contribute
to a better balanced world economy; and (4) to prevent undue Chinese
penetration and subsequent influence in Indochina so that the peoples of
Indochina will not be hampered in their natural developments by the pressure of
an alien people and alien interests.[7]
There were several problems with these goals from the
outset. These problems were compounded by the prejudices and fears inherent in
the Truman Doctrine. First, Indochina was still seen as a periphery issue to
the stability of Europe. This placed primary value on keeping the French happy.
Because of the fear of Communism the US refused to deal with the strongest
nationalist movement in Vietnam, that of Ho Chi Min. Even with the assurances
that Ho Chi Min was not in Stalin’s pocket, and the fact that the majority of
Vietnamese viewed him favorably, because his cause and his movement was
Communist they refused to back him.
In 1946, Ho proclaimed the independence of his nation.
Influenced by Thomas Jefferson, he referred to the American and French
revolutions, but not the Russian. He proclaimed self-determination and the
equality of nations as a factor in his expectation of Allied support. In
addition, the OSS officers who were in Vietnam at the time esteemed Ho,
assuring their superiors that he had the peoples approval and that he was a
capable leader and administrator.[8]
The
French used this to their advantage. They were not committed to the idea of a
free Indochina, and their administration was repressive and detrimental to the
freedom of the people. Because the US needed a stable France to maintain the
containment of the Soviets in Europe, the US would do no more than gently
reprimand the French for the atrocities committed in the name of colonialism. This
compromised all four long-term objectives of US policy.
By
1950, North Korean troops “surged” into South Korea and captured Seoul, the
capital. Six months prior, after taking control of China from Chiang Kai-shek,
Mao Zedong’s troops reached Vietnam. Both the Soviet Union and China recognized
the establishment of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. This recognition was
one element that led to the extension of the policy of containment to Indochina
and South East Asia. [9]
Rather than simply supporting the French for the sake of
Europe, the US now would attempt to contain the growth of Communism in South
East Asia. Paranoia reached a new level with the Domino Theory, which was the
idea that if Vietnam fell to Communism, then Laos, Cambodia, Thailand,
Malaysia, Indonesia, Burma, and India would soon follow.
Early in 1950, the US considered the possibility that Ho
might not be controlled by the Soviets when he requested and received recognition
of his regime from Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia, who was considered a renegade
Communist nationalist. The CIA was never sent into Vietnam to find out for sure
because “a white man would be very conspicuous… in order to have an effective
intelligence officer, he would have to have a little brown blood. Then, we
wouldn’t be able to trust him.” [10]
A few years prior to this, in an effort to appear to
embrace some of the US gentle demands, the French decided to lure Bo Dai back
to the throne. In 1945, Bo Dai had abdicated the throne, passing his authority
to Ho Chi Min. It took several years, but by 1948, with promises of the
independence and unity of Vietnam, the French were able to seduce him back to
the imperial throne. The whole thing was a farce. France maintained all
authority while Bo Dai acted as the figurehead of Vietnamese nationalism. In
1949, Bo Dai and Vincent Auriol, the French president, signed the Elysee
Agreement, which reconfirmed Vietnam’s independence, with the caveat that the
French would maintain control of Vietnam’s defense, diplomacy, and finances.
In 1950, Ho Chi Min promised the West that he would
guarantee Vietnam’s neutrality in the escalating “conflict between the West and
the Communist bloc.”[11]
He was ignored. Ho finally saw that the West would not help him. He turned to
the Soviets and the Chinese who recognized his regime. In doing so, he
confirmed the worst fears of the West. He was now seen as an instrument of
Moscow. Lumping him under the label of totalitarian Communism, the path forward
was clear. Overnight, the problem had become understandable. It now fit into
the comfortable categories described in the Truman Doctrine. Ho Chi Min was an
enemy.
Later
that year, congress approved $75 million dollars for the president to use for
military aid in Asia. Truman did not sign the legislation until July 26, 1950,
but on June 29, three days after the beginning of the Korean War, Truman
illegally sent eight C-47 cargo aircraft into Indochina.[12]
It became apparent to the US officials that France was
over-extended in Indochina. Dean Rusk, the Assistant Secretary of State for Far
Eastern affairs, viewed the French efforts in Vietnam as “a stand against
Soviet Expansion”[13]
and fought for greater economic and military aid for the French and the Bo Dai
government. The US established an embassy in Saigon and attempted to take a
greater role in the conflict, but the French stood in the way at every turn. They
suspected the US of trying to take over completely and fed them faulty or
outright false intelligence information. Though France made efforts to appear
as if they were giving the Bo Dai government more independence, they maintained
their control of the army “shipping, mines, plantations, banks, breweries, and
factories as well as imports and exports.”[14]
The next several years proved a protracted and bloody
conflict. The forces of Ho Chi Minh, even while making several mistakes, proved
more than a match for the French. The French underestimated the capability and
the motivation of Ho’s forces. By 1954 the French were stretch to the breaking
point and the whole thing came to a head in Dein Bien Phu.
Responding
to the move of Ho Chi Minh’s forces into Laos the French decided to occupy the
area from where Ho’s troops launched their assault, the valley where Dien Bien
Phu was located. The French dropped paratroopers into the valley to hold it for
when Ho’s troops returned. They established a garrison and three artillery
bases to protect the garrison.[15]
They
were surprised when 35, 000 of Ho Chi Minh’s forces moved to hold the high
ground around Dien Bien Phu. They assaulted the three artillery bases the
French had set up to protect main garrison and then moved against the garrison
itself. The French had miscalculated and now faced the potential loss of their
total holdings in Indochina. They asked the US for aid. In particular they
asked for a massive air assault to save the French garrison.
Eisenhower
was now President and he was faced with the prospect of the withdrawal of
France from Indochina. On April 5 he gave a press conference outlining the
Domino Theory. Yet the US decided not to intervene on behalf of the French. Eisenhower
decided to use the threat of intervention as leverage at the Geneva Talks. On
May 7, Dien Bien Phu fell. Ho Chi Minh believed he was now in a position to negotiate
from a place of strength and the French anxiously wanted an end to the
conflict.[16]
It
took ten weeks before a settlement was reached at Geneva and Ho was left with a
great deal less than what he thought he had won on the battlefield. Once again Vietnam
was held in tension between the interests of larger international forces. Even
when an agreement was reached the United States voted in such a way to leave
ambiguity as to its true position. President Eisenhower even stated that the
nation “had not in itself been party to or bound by the decisions taken by the
conference.”[17]
The
US realized the Democratic Republic of Vietnam had gained more than it lost. Its
legitimacy was now internationally sanctioned. Through an agreed upon
unification elections it was almost guaranteed that the DRV would win the
unification of the north and the south. In accordance with the policies of
containment the US moved to make sure the loss of North Vietnam did not domino
into a loss of all of South East Asia.
Much
like it did with NATO the US was the primary leader in the establishment of the
South Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). SEATO organized a treaty of mutual
defense that “circumvented the provisions in the Geneva agreements that
prohibited the Indochina governments from being a part of a military alliance.”[18]
This action, which extended the bias and the paranoia of the containment
policy, led to the military intervention of the US in Vietnam.
5.
Harry S. Truman, “Draft of speech, March 10, 1947.President’s Secretary’s
Files, Truman Papers. Harry S. Truman
Library and Museum. Accessed December 6. 2012, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/doctrine/large/documents/index.php?documentdate=1947-03-10&documentid=9-8&pagenumber=1
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