Tuesday, May 20, 2014

TRUMAN DOCTRIN AND VIETNAM


          World War II changed the political dynamic of the world. Nations who held enormous economic and political power were left with severely damaged infrastructures and many were nearly bankrupt. Because of the geographical location of the United States, it was largely untouched by the war. This left the US in a prime position to move into a place of leadership in the world. With a fairly stable economy and infrastructure, and a large military, the US was a true superpower. Despite the United States new status among the nations of the world, it “approached the postwar world with much uncertainty.”[1]

By the end of the war, a new adversary was rising. The Soviet Union was the largest and most powerful nation in Europe and Asia, and the United States strategists believed that the Soviets had plans for global domination. This was reinforced by Stalin’s reluctance to fulfill his pledge to free nations liberated from Nazi Germany after the war. Dean Acheson, the Undersecretary of State, was an advocate of force rather than negotiations in relationship with the Soviet Union. The failed attempts to appease Hitler taught him that “power, rather than negotiations, checked potential aggression…”[2] When the Soviets appeared to be taking advantage of the postwar situations in Greece and Turkey, Acheson warned that “the Communists would contaminate Western Europe and the Middle East”[3] in the same way that rot spread from fruit to fruit.

The Truman Doctrine[4] committed the US to aid and support both Greece and Turkey in an effort to deny them to the Soviet Union. It was a policy of containment that would build areas of strength around Soviet controlled territory seeking to stop the spread of the Soviet Union in particular and communism in general. Truman’s advisors believed this to be a struggle of life and death.

Using rhetoric of extremes, President Truman lumped all “ways of life” under two labels, “One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guaranties of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression”. He continues, “The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio, fixed elections and the suppression of personal freedoms”.[5] The language of the Truman Doctrine betrayed a deeply held sense of superiority which would show up again and again in US international policy. It was also a masterful effort to manipulate the situation through fear. By drawing such stark contrasts, President Truman effectively demanded that congress and the world choose sides. The fact that the sides were ideological extremes, defined in “black and white” language, helped to place the stakes well above the individual human beings who were involved on both sides of situation. Because it was the ideal that was at stake, atrocities could be committed and tolerated as long as the goal of the “greater picture” was held firmly in sight.

Less than a year after the implementation of the Truman Doctrine, the Marshal Plan was designed as a massive financial investment in the reconstruction of Western Europe.[6] Primarily focused on blocking Communist influence in France and Italy, the Marshal plan trapped the US into a game of blackmail with France in Indochina. Because the US believed it was fighting for global stakes, and France was simply trying to retain a colonial possession, the US had more invested in the stability of Indochina than the French did.

            In 1948, a review of US policy towards Indochina made it clear that the US long-term goals were not being met.

Our long-term objectives are: (1) to eliminate so far as possible Communist influence in Indochina and to see installed a self-governing nationalist state which will be friendly to the US and which, commensurate with the capacity of the peoples involved, will be patterned upon our conception of a democratic state as opposed to the totalitarian state which would evolve inevitably from Communist domination; (2) to foster the association of the peoples of Indochina with the western powers, the end that those peoples will prefer freely to cooperate with the western powers culturally, economically and politically; (3) to raise the standard of living so that the peoples of Indochina will be less receptive to totalitarian influences and will have an incentive to work productively and thus contribute to a better balanced world economy; and (4) to prevent undue Chinese penetration and subsequent influence in Indochina so that the peoples of Indochina will not be hampered in their natural developments by the pressure of an alien people and alien interests.[7]

            There were several problems with these goals from the outset. These problems were compounded by the prejudices and fears inherent in the Truman Doctrine. First, Indochina was still seen as a periphery issue to the stability of Europe. This placed primary value on keeping the French happy. Because of the fear of Communism the US refused to deal with the strongest nationalist movement in Vietnam, that of Ho Chi Min. Even with the assurances that Ho Chi Min was not in Stalin’s pocket, and the fact that the majority of Vietnamese viewed him favorably, because his cause and his movement was Communist they refused to back him.

            In 1946, Ho proclaimed the independence of his nation. Influenced by Thomas Jefferson, he referred to the American and French revolutions, but not the Russian. He proclaimed self-determination and the equality of nations as a factor in his expectation of Allied support. In addition, the OSS officers who were in Vietnam at the time esteemed Ho, assuring their superiors that he had the peoples approval and that he was a capable leader and administrator.[8]

The French used this to their advantage. They were not committed to the idea of a free Indochina, and their administration was repressive and detrimental to the freedom of the people. Because the US needed a stable France to maintain the containment of the Soviets in Europe, the US would do no more than gently reprimand the French for the atrocities committed in the name of colonialism. This compromised all four long-term objectives of US policy.

By 1950, North Korean troops “surged” into South Korea and captured Seoul, the capital. Six months prior, after taking control of China from Chiang Kai-shek, Mao Zedong’s troops reached Vietnam. Both the Soviet Union and China recognized the establishment of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. This recognition was one element that led to the extension of the policy of containment to Indochina and South East Asia. [9]

            Rather than simply supporting the French for the sake of Europe, the US now would attempt to contain the growth of Communism in South East Asia. Paranoia reached a new level with the Domino Theory, which was the idea that if Vietnam fell to Communism, then Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Burma, and India would soon follow.

            Early in 1950, the US considered the possibility that Ho might not be controlled by the Soviets when he requested and received recognition of his regime from Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia, who was considered a renegade Communist nationalist. The CIA was never sent into Vietnam to find out for sure because “a white man would be very conspicuous… in order to have an effective intelligence officer, he would have to have a little brown blood. Then, we wouldn’t be able to trust him.” [10]

            A few years prior to this, in an effort to appear to embrace some of the US gentle demands, the French decided to lure Bo Dai back to the throne. In 1945, Bo Dai had abdicated the throne, passing his authority to Ho Chi Min. It took several years, but by 1948, with promises of the independence and unity of Vietnam, the French were able to seduce him back to the imperial throne. The whole thing was a farce. France maintained all authority while Bo Dai acted as the figurehead of Vietnamese nationalism. In 1949, Bo Dai and Vincent Auriol, the French president, signed the Elysee Agreement, which reconfirmed Vietnam’s independence, with the caveat that the French would maintain control of Vietnam’s defense, diplomacy, and finances.

            In 1950, Ho Chi Min promised the West that he would guarantee Vietnam’s neutrality in the escalating “conflict between the West and the Communist bloc.”[11] He was ignored. Ho finally saw that the West would not help him. He turned to the Soviets and the Chinese who recognized his regime. In doing so, he confirmed the worst fears of the West. He was now seen as an instrument of Moscow. Lumping him under the label of totalitarian Communism, the path forward was clear. Overnight, the problem had become understandable. It now fit into the comfortable categories described in the Truman Doctrine. Ho Chi Min was an enemy. 

Later that year, congress approved $75 million dollars for the president to use for military aid in Asia. Truman did not sign the legislation until July 26, 1950, but on June 29, three days after the beginning of the Korean War, Truman illegally sent eight C-47 cargo aircraft into Indochina.[12]

            It became apparent to the US officials that France was over-extended in Indochina. Dean Rusk, the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern affairs, viewed the French efforts in Vietnam as “a stand against Soviet Expansion”[13] and fought for greater economic and military aid for the French and the Bo Dai government. The US established an embassy in Saigon and attempted to take a greater role in the conflict, but the French stood in the way at every turn. They suspected the US of trying to take over completely and fed them faulty or outright false intelligence information. Though France made efforts to appear as if they were giving the Bo Dai government more independence, they maintained their control of the army “shipping, mines, plantations, banks, breweries, and factories as well as imports and exports.”[14]

            The next several years proved a protracted and bloody conflict. The forces of Ho Chi Minh, even while making several mistakes, proved more than a match for the French. The French underestimated the capability and the motivation of Ho’s forces. By 1954 the French were stretch to the breaking point and the whole thing came to a head in Dein Bien Phu.

Responding to the move of Ho Chi Minh’s forces into Laos the French decided to occupy the area from where Ho’s troops launched their assault, the valley where Dien Bien Phu was located. The French dropped paratroopers into the valley to hold it for when Ho’s troops returned. They established a garrison and three artillery bases to protect the garrison.[15]

They were surprised when 35, 000 of Ho Chi Minh’s forces moved to hold the high ground around Dien Bien Phu. They assaulted the three artillery bases the French had set up to protect main garrison and then moved against the garrison itself. The French had miscalculated and now faced the potential loss of their total holdings in Indochina. They asked the US for aid. In particular they asked for a massive air assault to save the French garrison.

Eisenhower was now President and he was faced with the prospect of the withdrawal of France from Indochina. On April 5 he gave a press conference outlining the Domino Theory. Yet the US decided not to intervene on behalf of the French. Eisenhower decided to use the threat of intervention as leverage at the Geneva Talks. On May 7, Dien Bien Phu fell. Ho Chi Minh believed he was now in a position to negotiate from a place of strength and the French anxiously wanted an end to the conflict.[16]

It took ten weeks before a settlement was reached at Geneva and Ho was left with a great deal less than what he thought he had won on the battlefield. Once again Vietnam was held in tension between the interests of larger international forces. Even when an agreement was reached the United States voted in such a way to leave ambiguity as to its true position. President Eisenhower even stated that the nation “had not in itself been party to or bound by the decisions taken by the conference.”[17]

The US realized the Democratic Republic of Vietnam had gained more than it lost. Its legitimacy was now internationally sanctioned. Through an agreed upon unification elections it was almost guaranteed that the DRV would win the unification of the north and the south. In accordance with the policies of containment the US moved to make sure the loss of North Vietnam did not domino into a loss of all of South East Asia.

Much like it did with NATO the US was the primary leader in the establishment of the South Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). SEATO organized a treaty of mutual defense that “circumvented the provisions in the Geneva agreements that prohibited the Indochina governments from being a part of a military alliance.”[18] This action, which extended the bias and the paranoia of the containment policy, led to the military intervention of the US in Vietnam.



                1. Gary Hess, “To Dien Bien Phu: The United States and the French – Viet Minh War, 1946 – 1954,” in Vietnam and the United States: Origens and Legacy of the War, Revised Edition (New York, NY: Twayne Publishers, 1998), 33.
                2. Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York, NY: Viking Press, 1983) 170.
                3. Ibid.
                4. Truman Doctrine – a recording of the President Truman’s speech on March 12, 1947 on youtube.com, retrieved December 6, 2012.
                5. Harry S. Truman, “Draft of speech, March 10, 1947.President’s Secretary’s Files, Truman Papers. Harry S. Truman Library and Museum. Accessed December 6. 2012, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/doctrine/large/documents/index.php?documentdate=1947-03-10&documentid=9-8&pagenumber=1 
                6. Karnow, Vietnam: A History, 171.
                7. Robert McMahon, “Statement of U.S. Policy Toward Indochina, 1948,” in Major Problems in the History of the Vietnam War (Boston: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2008) 50.
                8. Gary Hess, Vietnam and the United States (New York: Twayne’s Publishers, 1998) 31.
                9. Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York: The Viking Press, 1983) 169.
                10. Ibid., 176.
                11. Ibid., 175.
                12. Ibid., 179
                13. Ibid.
                14. Ibid., 180.
                15. Gary Hess, Vietnam and the United States (New York: Twayne’s Publishers, 1998) 43.
                16. Ibid., 47.
                17. Ibid., 49.
                18. Ibid.

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